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The purpose of the present study was to assess links to previous familial issues as well as an 
understanding of mental states on disadvantaged adolescents while controlling for age, fluid 
intelligence, and verbal ability. The other objective was to compare atypical adolescents to 
typical counterparts about general reasoning and social understanding. 
Method 
Participants included 50 individuals who had experienced previous maltreatment (physical 
abuse/ neglect) aged 9 to 26 years-old and 90 university students (typical) aged 18 - 33 years-
old. Participants completed fluid intelligence task (Raven Progress Matrices), vocabulary task 
(Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test), Emotion Faces Task, Eye task, Point Light Tasks 
(emotion and action), and Mr Bean Task. 
Result 
Results of multivariate analysis of covariance of both groups indicated that the atypical group 
was not generally worse than the typical group on the tasks tapping social understanding; 
they were better on two tasks and worse on one task. The partial correlation analyses 
performed only on the atypical group indicated that the correlations were inconsistent in 
indicating that emotional/physical abuse was associated with both correct and incorrect 
responding to Mr Bean mental state task. 
Conclusions 
The findings suggest the complexity of the relation between social understanding and 
wellbeing variables, in that the maltreated youth would do well on one task and poorly on 
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Social understanding in the community: Establishing Links to Previous Familial Issues as 
 well as an Understanding of Mental States on Disadvantaged Adolescents 
 
How we see the world, ourselves and others as persons with dreams, feelings, wants 
and meaning, make our social interaction possible. These insights comprise our social 
understanding, which includes concepts such as a theory of mind, emotional recognition, and 
mental states. To appreciate social understanding, we must look at each of its components in 
more detail in the context of middle childhood and adolescence. These factors are especially 
important when the intervention for victims of childhood abuse is considered. Early 
childhood challenges, such as abuse (physical, sexual, or emotional) and neglect (absence of 
care, shelter, or food) impair social understanding on either the ability to perceive or 
anticipate other people’s behaviour or  sharing of their experience. In the present study, I 
explored the measure of social understanding for participants in their middle childhood and 
adolescence to assess relations to previous abuse or neglect and the present real-life 
functioning. This introduction is split into two sections. First, I examine the development of 
social understanding in typical development. Then I examine childhood maltreatment. 
 
Theory of Mind 
Most of the studies on the theory of mind (ToM) have focused on the preschool years. 
ToM refers to the ability to recognise and attribute mental states (thoughts, desires, emotions, 
understanding) to self, and to others, and to understand that others have beliefs, desires, 
emotions, and perspective that are different from one’s own (Baillargeon, 2010). 
The last three decades have seen the expansion of scientific enthusiasm in the human ability 
to reason about mental states and how children acquire ToM with interesting discussion 




research on infancy (e.g., Baillargeon, Scott, & He, 2010), middle childhood (Devine & 
Hughes, 2013), adolescence (Dumontheil, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010) and adulthood 
(Duval, Piolino, Bejanin, Eustache, & Desgranges, 2011) have seen a significant expansion in 
the developmental scope of this research field in recent years, although many earlier studies 
have focussed on the preschool years. An important drawback of most studies of ToM is the 
dependence on cross-sectional designs that exclude analysis of developmental relations. The 
present study will assess ToM across 9 to 25- years- old, to deal with these two gaps taking 
into account the earlier life history of participants (e.g., abuse) as a potential predictor of 
present ToM functioning. 
Most researchers agree that there is still much to learn about ToM beyond the age of 5, 
and the well-documented understanding of first-order false belief (the understanding that 
someone can hold a mistaken belief) (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Filippova & Astington, 2008; 
Smith & LaFreniere, 2009). However, Goldstein and Winner (2010) declared that “there is no 
consensus yet about what constitutes a more advanced theory of mind skill once the ability to 
represent false belief has been attained (p. 449).” 
Without a doubt, not much is known about ToM development in middle childhood. 
Nevertheless, there has been some groundwork to bring to light the description of ToM skills 
in middle childhood (Happé, 1994; Smith & LaFreniere, 2009). For instance, second-order 
false beliefs (i.e., false beliefs about false beliefs) have been designed (Perner & Wimmer, 
1985). About the age of 6 to 7 years, children do well in these second-order false belief tasks, 
strengthening the relevance use of those tasks in the early middle childhood (Perner & 
Wimmer, 1985; Sullivan, Zaitchick, & Tager-Flusberg, 1994). For example, the known Maxi 
story in Perner and Wimmer (1983) defines the second order. That is, the target for the belief 
is Maxi’s mother, and the question is where she thinks Maxi thinks the chocolate is located. 




changed the location in his absence, she should think that Maxi believes that the chocolate is 
still in the green box. The ascription of such belief to the mother is second-order reasoning, 
that is, a belief about someone else’s belief about something thing. 
Nevertheless, second-order false belief tasks possess several limitations, in that they 
provide useful information but not extensive information as to whether the child has grasped 
an essential level of ToM skills. The first limitation is the focus on only one form of mental 
state (false belief), because children develop an understanding of a variety of mental states, 
predominantly as they increase functioning in more multifaceted society (Hartup, 2005). 
Second, second-order false-belief tasks, which involve a question like, “Where will Sally look 
for her marble?”, fail to capture the dynamic nature of social demands in the real world (Klin, 
2000). Third, second-order false belief tasks evaluate ToM as either fail or pass. This rather 
simplistic measurement approach fails to capture the real variety of ToM skills shown in 
individuals (Klin, 2000). 
The limitations of second-order false belief tasks have given rise to a new type of 
measure for the evaluation of ToM in middle childhood. For example, strange stories task 
(Happé, 1994) proved to be efficient in evaluating school-aged children’s ability to understand 
internal states such as white lies, jokes, lies, figures of speech, double bluffs, or irony (Ronald, 
Viding, Happe, & Plomin, 2006). Another test examines the understanding of faux pas (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1999), that is, whether school-age children can recognise social blunders. In this 
task, children must use a sophisticated level of ToM to understand the listener and speaker 
viewpoints to detect faux pas effectively. Additionally, the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test 
(Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997) assesses children’s ability to interpret 
internal states from photographs of a person’s eye region (e.g., Ronald, Viding, Happé, & 
Plomin, 2006). In one study, the authors tested children’s skill in detecting deception and using 




(Smith & LaFreniere, 2009). Children watched video clips of an experimenter providing hints 
about the colour of cards by glancing at or pointing to the cards; children detected whether the 
hints were deceptive and used the information to win the game. Eight-year-olds were better 
able to use improved information in predicting their peers’ intention than 4 and 6-year-olds.  
The ability to conceptualise what another person might be thinking develops in 
middle childhood. During middle childhood, children learn that two people can talk about the 
same thing in different ways because of different perspectives, helping children to think about 
how other people might regard their thoughts, feelings, and behaviours (Im-Bolter, Agostino, 
and Owens-Jaffray, 2016). In other words, perspective-taking contains an awareness of one’s 
own mental states (‘first-person perspective’ or 1PP) as well as the capacity to reflect upon 
the mental states of another person (‘third-person perspective” or 3PP). Several tasks are 
available to assess perspective-taking. A prevalent task is the Director task in which the 
director instructs the listener, and the child’s task is to work out how the listener will act. In 
this task, the director must give instructions to the listener to retrieve a particular object. 
However, the perspectives of the director and listener differ such that the director might 
intend for the listener to retrieve a particular object; the listener cannot see that object. For 
example, in one study, participants aged 8, 12, and 24 years, were asked to use their 
imagination when answering a question about either their feelings or the feelings of a 
character in different posters. Their answers – choice of five possible emotion faces – were 
timed (Choudhury, Blakemore, and Charman, 2006). With this task, researchers were able to 
measure and demonstrate the variations in perspective-taking from middle childhood across 
adolescence. The results showed a decrease in RT with age between pre-adolescence, 
adolescence, and adulthood. 
Studies examining middle childhood show that children come to understand variations 




1999), to recognise internal states from facial expressions around the eyes (Baron-Cohen et al., 
1997; 2001), and to identify deceptive information and apply it to their advantage (Smith & 
LaFreniere, 2009). 
Although there has been an advancement in ToM tests to deal with complex ToM skills 
in middle childhood, advanced research on ToM abilities is still infrequent. One of the 
limitations of existing ToM research in middle childhood is that it is often confounded with 
reading and verbal skills. That is, most of the tasks use a question-and-answer format that does 
not follow the framework of an actively fluent social interaction. 
Despite this, in middle childhood, children are involved in an increasingly complex 
social world, with a gap concerning children’s social interaction and their ability to use their 
ToM skills (Yoon, 2015). In recent past, the interest in ToM abilities beyond childhood has 
soared, these abilities are measured using various tasks different from false belief task 
(Henry, Phillips, Ruffman, & Bailey, 2013; Miller, 2012). In fact, these studies have reported 
the relation between ToM and other critical social capabilities (Massaro, Valle, & Marchetti, 
2013; Massaro, Valle, & Marchetti, 2014), which is present in childhood (Apperly, & 
Blakemore, 2010; Sommerville, Bernstein, & Meltzoff, 2013). Adolescence is a time for 
many changes in areas such as cognitive, relational and socio-emotional understanding 
(Eccles, Templeton, Barber, & Sotone, 2003). Furthermore, relationships with other people 
become highly significant in adolescence, which demands unique relational abilities to 
understand one’s own and others’ minds (Kenny, Dooley, & Fitzgerald, 2013). However, 
studying ToM in adolescence presents difficulties since the development of new ToM tasks is 
essential for examining age differences (Moran, 2013).  
It is essential when examining ToM in adolescence, to also consider more general cognitive 
changes to determine whether changes in ToM are independent of changes in general 




Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) (Dunn & Dunn, 2007), for which the participant has to 
choose the correct word best describing one picture among four presented. This task is a 
standardised test of the individual’s verbal ability and suitable for use in children aged five 
and above. Milligan, Astington, and Dack’s (2007) meta-analysis showed that false belief 
task performance was independent of age but determined by language capability, describing 
why there are differences in the precise age false belief tasks are passed. These studies show 
ToM being continuous, starting in the early stages of vocabulary development. 
Consequently, language impacts ToM task performance. The present study also uses 
the vocabulary test to find out whether age-related changes in ToM are independent of 
vocabulary development. Another standard task evaluates non-verbal reasoning, assessing 
fluid intelligence (Duncan, 2005). Raven’s Progressive Matrices (Raven, Raven, & Court, 
2003) presents children with a series of shapes that follow a logical pattern, and the child’s 
task is to work out the correct answer from amongst eight possibilities. Nevertheless, fluid 
intelligence and verbal ability are rarely controlled for in studies that have assessed middle 
childhood development (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 1999 and Dumontheil et al., 2010). 
Consequently, further studies are needed to develop current findings. 
 
The Diverse Range of Tasks beyond the False Belief Task 
Devine and Hughes (2013) suggested that ToM tasks should be age-appropriate and 
put additional requirements on understanding beliefs in complex, contextualised situations as 
children come of age. After childhood, children improve in their skill to concurrently deduce 
a diversity of mental states in complicated social situations and grow increasingly aware of 




can be comprised of cartoons or stories and illustrate a different aspect of relational 
situations, where participants are required to make out the behaviour or action of an actor. 
 For instance, in the Strange Stories task (Happé, 1994), the participant must give an 
account of mental state on the behaviour of a character in situations of sarcasm, white lie, 
misunderstanding and so on. In the Faux Pas task (Stone, Baron-Cohen, & Knight, 1998), 
children are expected to concurrently recognise the intentions, knowledge and emotions of 
the characters. Arguably, if we consider the single questions that precede each Faux Pas task 
story, all primary school children should be nearly as good at answering such questions, 
because such children can ascribe ignorance to others and know the causes of negative 
emotions and intentions (Wellman & Liu, 2004). Furthermore, these two tasks demand 
children use their ToM abilities not in a single, although complicated, circumstance but rather 
in a diversity of contexts (Miller, 2012). Children find this diversity difficult because it 
requires them to use mental state inferences that are suitable to catch the critical feature of the 
given social circumstances.  
Devine and Hughes (2013) devised another task examining middle childhood 
development, the “Silent Film” task, which requires participants to use their understanding of 
beliefs and desires to describe the behaviour of actors in situations shown in brief clips from a 
classic silent film, Harold Lloyd’s comedy, Safety Last (Roach, Newmeyer, & Taylor, 1923). 
This task seems better than the other tasks described above because of a specific focus on 
participants’ understanding of beliefs and desires, the use of nonverbal film clips, and the 
requirement for participants to make contextual inferences from what they see the 
participants doing rather than from written texts. Even though the silent film task is not the 
first to use film clips, it has three advantageous characteristics. One, it mainly taps 
participants’ understanding of beliefs and desires rather than emotions. Two, the task is 




humorous and thereby engaging. Three, the clips have been selected uniquely for older 
children rather than adults.  
The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & 
Plumb, 2001) has also been used with older children. This task requires the participant to 
select the best label for the cognitive or emotional state from an actor’s eye region. Another 
task is a standard Emotion Recognition from faces task (e.g., Ruffman, Murray, Halberstadt, 
& Vater, 2012), where the participant chooses the best label for emotion from a character’s 
facial expression. Finally, in the Bodily Emotion Task (Ruffman, Halberstadt, & Murray, 
2009), the participant has to identify the emotion conveyed by bodily motion, or in a control 
task, the action conveyed in bodily motion. In sum, these tasks are appropriate to examine 
ToM beyond middle childhood. 
 
Childhood Maltreatment 
Adolescence is a period in which cognition and the brain undergo dramatic parallel 
development. ToM permits the understanding and evaluation of other people’s behaviours 
based on their mental states. The development of ToM skills such as false beliefs, 
understanding the influence of emotions on other people’s beliefs and fixed mental states are 
essential in shaping interpersonal interactions, interpreting social cues and regulating 
behaviours (Astington, 2001). Therefore, delays in ToM skills development in childhood may 
impact negatively social understanding in adolescence and beyond.  In this section, I consider 
some of the factors that can impair core ToM skills development. 
 
Abuse  
Many childhood traumas alter cognitive development in general, with some traumas 
explicitly linked to certain features of social cognitive development (Germine, Dunn, 




in emotion perception, but not with impairments in the detection of normal emotions. In one 
study, 24 maltreated children aged 8 to 10 years old looked at 16 colour images showing 
facial expressions of anger, fear, happiness, and sadness on a high-resolution touch screen 
(Germine et al., 2015).  
Researchers asked children to find the emotion represented on the screen by choosing a 
written label or cartoon image of emotion, at 3-second intervals. Physically abused children 
accurately recognised facial displays of anger based on less perceptual information than did 
controls. In contrast, abused participants needed more sensory input to depict sad facial 
expressions than the control group. These findings suggest that children exposed to a high 
level of aggression from parents tend to need more information to recognise facial 
expressions of sadness accurately. The lack of recognition of sadness is consistent with 
studies finding that abusive mothers show less facial muscle tone, might result in a relatively 
poor expression of sadness for the viewers (Pollak & Sinha, 2002).  
Another study examined 94 maltreated 9-year-old children exposed to high levels of 
parental anger and physical threat (Pollack, Messner, Kistler, & Cohn, 2009). Participants 
viewed a collection of images showing the development of facial expression, ranging from 
neutral to pure emotions. Each child saw five emotions, each emotion represented by four 
different models. Once again, abused children were fast to recognise anger, with the 
researchers concluding that high-level exposure to anger sensitises abused children to 
recognise it in its early formation.  
In sum, both studies demonstrated that children exposed to abnormally high levels of 
anger were more accurate in recognising anger than typical children. However, other than 
sadness in one study, there was no difference between abused and non-abused children in 
recognition of others emotions, suggesting that abused children had no bias to select anger or 






This abuse is a constant inadequacy to meet a child’ s fundamental needs and is the 
most common type of child abuse (Doretto & Sciveletto, 2018). For example, neglect refers 
to situations such as prolonged lack of attention, care, and love to children from their parents 
or caregivers, or children left without adequate shelter, clothing, and healthcare. Severe 
childhood neglect has a profound adverse effect on various facets of cognitive functioning. 
Peirera et al. (2016) found that middle childhood neglect relates to poorer cognition and 
educational qualifications in adolescence and the relations were still present in mid-life.  
Peirera et al. (2016) evaluated cognitive abilities at seven,11, and 16 years (math, 
reading, and general intellectual ability) and 50 years (immediate/delayed memory, verbal 
fluency, processing speed). Participants’ information on cognition and mental health derived 
from the 1958 British cohort study. The findings showed that child neglect strongly related to 
cognitive impairments from childhood to adulthood. For example, the most neglected of the 
population had lower cognitive scores at 16 years and impairment at 50 years compared to 
non-neglected. Neglected children also showed an increased risk of poor academic 
qualifications. All forms of abuse and child neglect were related to childhood and adulthood 
problem behaviour, but there was no association between abuse and cognitive abilities. 
In contrast, Mills et al. (2011) found that both child abuse and neglect independently 
relate to deficits in cognition and academic functioning in adolescence. Participants recruited 
from a birth cohort study and the database contained alleged suspected child maltreatment 
confidential reports. The notification to the state child-protection authority for suspected 
maltreatment (abuse, neglect, or both) served as the main predictor variable. Notification to 
the state for child maltreatment was related to a lower score on both the Range Achievement 
Test and Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices. The researchers concluded that both abuse 




that early familial dysfunction retards certain aspects of the development of areas of the brain 
associated with empathy. In their meta-analysis, Imuta, Henry, Slaughter, Selcuk, and 
Ruffman (2016) found worse social cognition to be associated with ostracism by peers and 
subsequent bullying. Although few studies have attempted to identify a specific association 
between early maltreatment and cognition development in typical children (Mills et al., 
2011), not enough research has examined explicitly whether childhood maltreatment 
associates with social understanding in atypical young people. 
 
Extreme parenting experiences (EPE) 
 
Children who are emotionally or physically abused or neglected have an excellent 
chance for impaired socio-development in the presence of EPE. Research shows that 
maltreated children interact with people differently than children without maltreated histories 
(Luke & Banerjee, 2012). The overall assessment of the association between maltreatment 
(abuse or neglect) and different skills of social understanding shows a negative effect of 
maltreatment. For example, more negative behaviours are associated with peer rejection and 
social reputations deriving from child maltreatment (e.g., Anthonysamy & Zimmer-
Gembeck, 2007). Below I investigate the connection of the development of social 
understanding in maltreating background. 
 
Present study 
The present study aimed to investigate links to previous familial issues (e.g. child 
abuse) as well as an understanding of mental states on disadvantaged adolescents when 
controlling for age, fluid intelligence, and vocabulary. The second aim was to draw a 
comparison between atypical youths and typical ones about general reasoning and social 




were administered in different conditions for each group. For example, an incorrect option 
referring to Mr Bean’s mental states was added to the mental state type of questions for the 
atypical group. This group had 20 questions as opposed to 15 questions for the typical group. 
Therefore, I did not include the Mr Bean task while drawing the comparison between the two 
groups. Still, I considered the Mr Bean task while examining the links between past 
maltreatment and present mental states on underprivileged youth (Appendix A and B). 
 Participants completed age-appropriate measures of vocabulary (PPVT), fluid 
intelligence (RPM), eye task, emotion faces tasks, point light tasks (action and emotion), 
intending to investigate tasks tapping mental states. Devine and Hughes (2013) proposed that 
the reliability of assessing individual difference requires the improvement of measures. To 
this end, I used Mr eight minutes of Mr Bean video, “Mr Bean Rides Again” (Curtis et al., 
1992). The Mr Bean task is novel, providing a measure that directly compares children’s 
mental state understanding with their real-world knowledge, all taken from the same task. Mr 
Bean is the main actor who easily creates gaffes wherever he is and does not speak clearly, 
making the task more dependent on the understanding of beliefs than speech capacity. The 
clips are age-appropriate, and the humorous scenes are most likely to entertain adolescents. 
These characteristics resemble Devine and Hughes (2013)’ silent Film tasks.  
The Mr Bean task had 10 multiple-choice questions. These questions were divided 
into two categories of five questions, namely, mental state questions and general reasoning 
questions, with each question having four different options. Answers to mental state 
questions (e.g., Why does Mr Bean not want to touch the man’s lips?) were best answered by 
referring to Mr Bean’s mental states to explain his actions (the multiple-choice option, Mr 
Bean does not know what to do. He wants to help the man but does not want to touch the 
man’s lips). A second correct option explained Mr Bean’s actions but without referring to 




(incorrect) option referred to Mr Bean’s mental states, but in an unnecessarily negative way 
(Mr Bean does not know what to do. He does not want to touch the man’s lips in case it 
makes the man angry). Finally, the fourth (incorrect) option explained Mr Bean’s actions 
without referring to mental states and in an incorrect way (Mr Bean is using a paper tube for 
hearing what the man is saying). 
For general reasoning, questions (e.g., Why does Mr Bean give the man the pill?) 
there were three options, including one mental state (positively worded and incorrect) and 
two non-mental state options (one correct, one incorrect). In the Mr Bean task, participants 
had three choices to choose from rather than freely answering questions to avoid excessive 
verbal demands and what Devine and Hughes (2013) described as shared demands on 
participants’ capacity to comprehend meaning rather than to understand mental states. The 
preferred use of mental states over other interpretations was possible with the availability of 
mental and non-mental state options.  
Participants in a community sample of troubled youth aged 9 to 26 years old were 
assessed with a fluid intelligence task (RPM), verbal ability (PPVT), and tasks tapping social 
understanding.  
The Mr Bean task was utilised to measure the correct use of mental state and general 
reasoning abilities. This task aimed to measure social understanding in vulnerable youths to 
examine links to previous maltreatment (i.e., abuse and neglect) as well as current social 
issues when partialling out age, fluid intelligence, and vocabulary. The other aim of using 
these tasks was to examine differences between the troubled youths (the atypical) group and a 
typical group, independent of age, vocabulary and fluid intelligence, and also, to examine 




 I hypothesised that the correct use of mental state reasoning and general reasoning 
skills in the Mr Bean task would be lower in adolescents with a previous history of 
maltreatment. Theses correlations would be independent of age, vocabulary, and fluid 
intelligence. It was also hypothesised that disadvantaged adolescents would respond poorly in 
tasks tapping social understanding compared to typical counterparts. I also hypothesised 
typical youth would do better than atypical youth in the general reasoning and social 
cognition tasks. Finally, I expected that tasks measuring social understanding for the typical 






Participants were 140 children and adolescents. Children and youths in the atypical 
group consisted of 11 children and 39 youth adolescents (Matypical = 18.19 years, SD = 2.34, 
range: 9 years to 26 years, 23 females and 27 males) who had experienced previous 
maltreatment (physical abuse/ neglect). The typical group consisted of 90 youths (Mtypical = 
19.97 years, SD = 2.13, range: 18 years to 33 years, 79 females and 11 males) who were first- 
and second-year undergraduate students at Otago. The rate of abuse in this group was 
unknown and likely reflective of the general population but would surely have been lower 
than the atypical group. The typical group participated and wrote a report for extra credit for 
their psychology class. The atypical youths were recruited from Mirror services, a local 
agency in Dunedin dealing with troubled youth, they were given movie vouchers for their 
contribution. For the analyses comparing typical and atypical youths, I excluded 19 
participants who were less than 16 years old to try to roughly balance the ages. This left 31 





Procedure and measures 
Mirror staff selected participants for testing and ran through the information sheet and 
consent form with youth. These participants were Mirror’s current clients. The University of 
Otago Human Ethics Committee granted ethical approval for the present study. Two 
locations were used to run the experiment: (1) Mirror Services’ office for atypical youths and 
(2) the developmental psychology lab at Otago university for the typical youths. All 
participants were tested individually, with youth and the experimenter sitting side by side in 
front of a computer. Participants watched videos in various tasks and looked at a book with 
images. Subsequently, participants were asked to identify emotions or explain people’s 
actions. Participants’ answers were recorded on a sheet of paper and coded using numbers 
and alphabetic letters to hide the participant’s identity. The whole process took 
approximatively 30 minutes per individual. 
 
General Cognition Measures 
 
Vocabulary aptitude. The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test-4 (PPVT-4) (Dunn & 
Dunn, 2007) designed to assess receptive vocabulary. Participants were shown a series of 
four pictures and asked to name or point to the corresponding answer of the word given. The 
appropriate starting age, as recommended by the PPVT-4, was implemented. However, the 
test was modified to which participants could only answer up to the third row of question. 
The task would stop up to three consecutive fails were obtained. PPVT-4 scores were 
calculated by taking the participant’s high score answer minus one point of every incorrect 
previous answer. 
 Fluid intelligence. Raven’s Progressive Matrices (RPM) (John & Raven, 2003) is a 




of shapes that followed a logical pattern, with their task to predict the next shape in the 
progression from amongst possible options. Items were identified as AB and B; 16 items 
(AB1, AB4, AB6, AB7, AB8, AB9, AB10, AB11, and AB12) were used because the full 
measure was time-consuming and too long (e.g. Figure 1). Participants were shown a pattern 
with a missing piece, and they had to pick the best fit for the missing piece of the matrix from 
six items by pointing or saying the number of the missing item. There was no time limit for 
the answer, and participants were shown one problem at a time. Responses were summed up 
for each participant’s correct answers. 
    
 
    
    
    
    
    
    
Figure 1: Raven’s Progressive Matrices 
 
Social Cognition Measures 
Emotion Faces task (Dunn & Dunn, 2007). Participants were assessed using 24 facial 
photos from the NimStim stimuli set. Following Ruffman, Murray, Halberstadt, and Vater 




as anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise. For each photo, participants were 
required to choose one from six emotion categories. The original task required 48 photos but 
was reduced to 24 photos due to time constraints. Participants needed to decide if a given 
face is angry, disgusted, fearful, happy, sad, or surprise (essentially a forced choice between 
six options). Then, I calculated recognition accuracy using an unbiased hit rate for each 
emotion (as in Wagner 1993). The unbiased hit rate is the correct answers squared, divided 
by the number of times that answer is used, multiplied by the number of trials where that 
answer was correct. 
The Eyes task (Reading the Mind in the Eyes task) (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore 
and Robertson, 1997). This task required the understanding of various emotions and mental 
states expressed in the eye region (e.g., terrified, upset, annoyed, arrogant). Only 14 items of 
the 28 were used in this experiment due to time constraints. Participants were shown pictures 
of a pair of eyes expressing emotions and had to pick the best possible description for the 
expression. To make sure that participants clearly understood the instruction, the 
experimenter ran a practice task. Answers were recorded on paper, and later coded as correct 
or incorrect. Interrater reliability was then calculated using the kappa statistic (McHugh, 
2012). 
Bodily emotion recognition (Ruffman, Halberstadt, and Murray, 2009).  Twenty-four 
point-light videos (displays that show motion by attaching lights to major bodily joints) were 
used: 12 emotion and 12 action. The only visible cues to the motion were lights, with the 
actor expressing anger, sadness, fear, disgust and happiness for the emotion items, which 
were conveyed by stereotypic movements (e.g. stamping feet and shaking head for anger). In 
the control task, the 12 displays revealed non-emotional actions such as driving, cycling, and 




“What is shown here?”). The correct answers were added up and divided by the total number 
of responses to calculate the average score. 
Mr Bean Task. This task was only given to the atypical group. The task consisted of a 
video (8’15”) from a comedy based on a Mr Bean skit in which Mr Bean must help a man 
who has had a heart attack (‘Mr Bean Rides Again’, Curtis et al., 1992). The video was 
stopped at various points to ask questions about why Mr Bean had acted in particular ways. 
Five questions were best answered by referring to Mr Bean’s mental states, and five were 
best answered by appealing to general non-mental state explanations. Figure 2 shows the 
actions from a sample clip in which Mr Bean was giving cardiopulmonary resuscitation 
(CPR) to try to help the man. Rather than touching the man’s lips, Mr Bean chose to roll up a 
magazine and blow through that. For each question, the experimenter paused the video to ask 
the question. Each question for mental states had four options: (1) Mental State Correct, Non-
Mental State Correct, Mental State Negative, and Non-Mental State Incorrect. For general 
reasoning, the options were: Non-Mental State Correct, Non-Mental State Incorrect, and 
Mental State Incorrect.  Scores were calculated by counting the frequency of answer type for 
each, resulting in four scores for Mr Bean Mental State questions and three scores for Mr 












Sample Silent Film task item           
 
  
         
          
          
          
          
          
Screenshot from ‘Mr. Bean rides again’ (Published in 2009) 
   
What motivated Mr Bean’s actions? 
     
- Mr Bean does not know what to do. He wants to help the man, but he does not want 
to touch the man’s lips. 
- Mr Bean does not know what to do. He wants to help the man, but he does not want 
to touch the man’s lips, in case he makes him angry 
- Mr Bean is using a paper tube to blow air into the main’s 
lips. 
   
- Mr Bean is using a paper tube for hearing what the man is 
saying. 
    
Figure 2: Mr Bean Rides Again screenshots 
 
Wellbeing Items 
Mirror services collect information on each client using a “presenting concerns” form. 
The items consisted of a three-point rating of previous maltreatment such as violence, 
neglect, family separation, parent/child relation, and emotion/physical abuse. The ratings 
were as follows: 1 = mild, 2 = moderate, and 3 = severe. For this study, I did not consider 
creating an abuse/maltreatment variable, although maltreatment may mean abuse. As per the 
‘presenting concerned form’ (Appendix C), the individual’s wellbeing categories (violence, 
neglect, E/P abuse) measured the trauma experienced. Also, the individual category 




well as emotional/ psychological items. In addition, the form included information regarding 
psychological outcomes (psychological functioning), which included depression, anger, 
mood, anxiety/fear, and attachment (Appendix C). I examined the correlations between social 
understanding and wellbeing in the atypical group. 
 
Results 
Atypical group correlations 
First, I examined the measures of wellbeing amongst the atypical group. Table 1 
includes the descriptive statistics and also provides descriptive statistics for the entire sample 
(unlike Table 4, which was primarily based on the reduced sample of 31). I then examined 
the correlations between the measures of wellbeing, the tasks tapping social understanding, 
and the measures of age, fluid intelligence and language. I added wellbeing items (violence, 
neglect, emotional/ physical abuse, family separated, parent /child relation, anxiety/fear, 
mood, depression, attachment, anger, maltreatment history, and psychological outcomes) in 
Table 1,  but not in Table 4 because these variables involved only the atypical group, which 
was the experimental group. Table 2 (Appendix D) shows the correlation coefficients for the 
atypical group. Mental state scores were significantly related to general reasoning and most 
of the previous maltreatment and psychological outcomes in this small sample of atypical 
youths. There were also significant negative correlations between Mr Bean Mental State-MS 
negative and (a) emotional/psychological abuse, (b) anxiety/fear and (c) mood. That is, 
atypical youths who offered more (incorrect) negative mental state interpretations on mental 
state items had experienced, less emotional/psychological abuse, less anxiety/fear, and a 
worse mood (high score = better score). There was also a positive correlation between Mr 
Bean Mental State-NMS and emotional/psychological abuse. Thus, atypical youth who gave 




levels of emotional/psychological abuse. Further, worse recognition of emotion was 
associated with more neglect. 
The only other correlates of task performance or wellbeing on the atypical group were 
age, language and fluid intelligence. For this reason, I next computed partial correlations, 





















Table 1     
Descriptive Statistics for the Atypical Group (n= 50)     
  M SD 
Age 15.68 3.95 
Fluid intelligence 12.58 3.18 
Vocabulary 161.7 25.88 
Eyes Task 0.75 0.14 
Point Light Action bodies 0.80 0.12 
Point Light Emotion bodies 0.81 0.09 
Facial Anger 0.87 0.12 
Facial Fear 0.39 0.24 
Facial Disgust 0.38 0.17 
Facial Sadness 0.42 0.23 
Facial Surprise 0.64 0.20 
Facial Happiness 0.95 0.16 
Total Emotion 0.61 0.09 
Bean MS-MS correct 2.40 1.46 
Bean MS-NMS correct 1.14 1.03 
Bean MS-MS negative 0.52 0.61 
Bean MS-NMS incorrect 0.14 0.40 
Bean GR-NMS correct 4.02 1.56 
Bean GR-NMS incorrect 0.04 0.20 
Bean GR-MS incorrect 0.14 0.40 
Violence 0.38 0.92 
Neglect 0.30 0.74 
Emotional/Physical Abuse 0.28 0.83 
Family Separated 0.82 1.04 
Parent/Child Relation 0.76 1.06 
Anxiety/Fear 0.64 0.98 
Mood 0.86 1.03 
Depression 0.82 1.02 
Attachment 0.38 0.81 
Anger 0.40 0.83 
Maltreatment history 2.54 2.92 
Psychological Outcome 3.10 3.16 
Note. **p < .01; *p < .05.  Bean MS-MS correct = number of Bean Mental State items with a correct mental state 
response; Bean MS-NMS correct = number of Bean Mental State items with a correct non-mental state response; Bean 
MS-MS negative = number of Bean Mental State items with an incorrect negatively slanted mental state response; Bean 
GR-MS incorrect = number of Bean General Reasoning items with an incorrect mental state response; Bean GR-NMS 
correct = number of Bean General Reasoning items with a correct non-mental state response; Bean GR-NMS incorrect = 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3 (Appendix E) includes the correlations for the atypical group, having 
partialled out age, language, and fluid intelligence. Of note, there were no significant 
correlations for neglect, family separated, parent/child relation, depression, attachment, 
anger, or maltreatment history with any of the emotion or mental state variables. In contrast, 
there were significant relations between emotional/physical abuse and more correct mental 
state responses on the Mr Bean mental state items, fewer incorrect negative mental state 
responses on the Mr Bean mental state items, and more incorrect non-mental state responses 
on the Mr Bean mental state items. These correlations are inconsistent in indicating that 
emotional/physical abuse was associated with both correct and incorrect responding to Mr 
Bean mental state. The only other correlations were that incorrect negative mental state 
responses on the Mr Bean mental state items were also associated with less anxiety/fear, a 
worse mood, and a worse overall psychological outcome. In short, the pattern of correlations 


























Atypical and typical groups comparison 
Next, I compared the atypical to the typical group. Because of the difference in age 
between the two groups, and because the atypical group included children, I initially 
restricted the atypical group to just those 16 years and over (16 to 26). This was a 
compromise designed to maximise the number of participants in the atypical group, while at 
the same time providing a group who were developmentally similar to the typical group aged 
18 to 33. This resulted in a group of 31 atypical participants. I then checked whether there 
was developmental improvement in ToM in the atypical group. If there were not, this would 
help to justify the inclusion of 16-year-olds (slightly younger than the typical group) in the 
atypical group. Age didn’t correlate with performances in the Emotion Faces task, r = -.118, 
p = .528, Point Light Action, r = .101, p = .589, or Point Light Emotion, r = -.034, p = .855. 
There was a marginally significant improvement with age in performance on the Eyes task, r 
= .338, p = .063, and for this reason, I co-varied out age in the analyses below when 
comparing the typical and atypical groups. Thus, all subsequent comparisons between the two 
groups are based on the restricted number of 31 atypical participants aged 16 years and over, 
except for analyses for the Mr Bean measures, which are based on the full sample of 50 
atypical participants. The atypical group was restricted because it included a wide range of 
age (9 to 26-years-old) participants, while the typical had typical 18-years old and above. 
Descriptive statistics. Table 4 shows the mean scores on each of the main key 
variables for the two groups (typical and atypical). Typical and atypical groups were different 
in age t (119) = 3.90, p =.001, fluid intelligence t (33.30) = 2.94, p = .006, and vocabulary t 
(62.36) = 6.87, p = .001. Therefore, these three variables were treated as covariates in the 








I compared the atypical and typical groups with a multivariate analysis of covariance 
with three covariates (age, vocabulary, fluid intelligence). The dependent variables were the 
scores for the Point Light Emotion task (proportion correct), the Point Light Action task 
(proportion correct), the Eyes task (proportion correct), and the Faces Emotion task (unbiased 
Table 4  
    
Atypical and Typical Youths’ Mean Scores (and Standard Deviations) on Key 
Variables     
 
Atypical1 Typical2 
  M SD M SD 
Age 18.19c 2.34 19.97d 2.12 
Fluid intelligence 12.81c 3.54 14.73d 1.40 
Vocabulary 176.97c 15.10 199.81d 18.22 
Point Light Action Bodies 0.84a 0.11 0.78b 0.14 
Point Light Emotion Bodies 0.81a 0.08 0.67b 0.17 
Emotion Faces 0.59c 0.09 0.65d 0.11 
Eyes Task 0.75 0.14 0.80 0.12 
BeanMS-MS correct 2.40 1.46   
BeanMS-NMS correct 1.14 1.03   
BeanMS-MS negative 0.52 0.61   - 
BeanMS-NMS incorrect 0.14 0.41   
BeanGR-MS incorrect 0.14 0.41   
BeanGR-NMS correct 4.02 1.56   
BeanGR-NMS incorrect 0.04 0.20   
Note. 1n = 31 for all tasks except Bean tasks, for which n = 50. 2n = 90. abAtypical group obtained a higher score than 
the typical group. cdTypical group obtained a higher score than the atypical group. BeanMS-MS correct = number of 
Bean Mental State items with a correct mental state response; BeanMS-NMS correct = number of Bean Mental State 
items with a correct non-mental state response; BeanMS-MS negative = number of Bean Mental State items with an 
incorrect negatively slanted mental state response; BeanGR-MS incorrect = number of Bean General Reasoning 
items with an incorrect mental state response; BeanGR-NMS correct = number of Bean General Reasoning items 
with a correct non-mental state response; BeanGR-NMS incorrect = number of Bean General Reasoning items with 




hit rate). The fixed factor was the group. There was a significant effect of Group overall 
tasks, F (4, 113) = 7.30, p < .001, ηp2 = .205. When broken down by individual tasks, there 
was a significant effect of group for the Point Light Action task, F(1, 116) = 7.74, p = .006, 
ηp2 = .063, the Point Light Emotion task, F(1, 116) = 11.08, p = .001, ηp2 = .087, and the 
Emotion Faces task, F(1, 116) = 5.21, p = .024, ηp2 = .043. The atypical group was better on 
the two Point Light tasks, whereas the typical group was better on the emotion Faces task. In 
general, then, contrary to expectations, the atypical group was not generally worse than the 
typical group on the tasks tapping social understanding; they were better on two tasks and 
worse on one task. 
Correlations. Pearson’s product-moment correlations were used to examine the 
relation between measures (see Tables 5a and 5b). In this case, separate correlations were 
computed for the typical and atypical groups, and there was no longer a need to exclude 
younger participants from the atypical group so that the full sample of 50 was examined. I 
computed the correlations for the atypical group and the typical group independently. 
Therefore, I was able to apply the correlations separately to the corresponding group. The 
correlations were positive between age and fluid intelligence (rt = .17, p< .05, df = 96), and 
age and language (ra = .91, p< .01; rt = .18, p< .05, df = 46) in both the atypical and typical 
groups. Table 5a (Appendix F) shows that age correlated with language ability for atypical 
youths. However, aside from the correlations between different measures of facial emotion 
recognition (which are theoretically uninteresting), the data for the atypical group did not 
support the commonly reported pattern for typical children in which language correlates with 
social understanding. Vocabulary ability did not influence tasks tapping social understanding. 




Table 5b (Appendix G) shows the correlations for typical youths. Again, age 
correlated with language, and with a few exceptions, the overall pattern was that the tasks 
measuring social understanding failed to correlate with each other and with the measures of 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The primary goal of the current study was to provide a psychometric tool to examine 
a group of children, adolescents and young adults experiencing adverse circumstances and 
who mainly had a history of adverse circumstances in their development (the atypical group). 
My interest was in comparing the social understanding of a typical and atypical group and 
examining how previous maltreatment might be related to current social functioning. Little is 
known about mental state reasoning in middle childhood and adolescence, although evidence 
is accumulating in the literature regarding theory of mind in middle childhood and 
adolescence (Devine & Hughes, 2013).  A gap still exists in understanding the relationship 
between previous maltreatment and current function in atypical youth. Addressing this 
limitation, the current study revealed significant associations between childhood 
maltreatment and present social understanding (i.e., ability to conceptualise what another 
person might be thinking). In addition, findings were not always as anticipated in that 
performance on the tasks tapping social understanding was sometimes better in the atypical 
group compared to the typical group. Below, I summarise the findings in more detail. 
 
Emotion Recognition 
The atypical group obtained higher scores on the Point Light Action Bodies (PLAB) 
and Point Light Emotion Bodies (PLEB) tasks, but lower scores on the Emotion Face (EF) 
tasks relative to the typical group. This indicates that in general, some areas of social 
understanding (SU) remain intact in atypical youths and continue to develop to the extent that 
these abilities exceed those in a typical population. This is consistent with the previous study 
by Miller-Perrin, Perrin and Kocur (2009), who found that the effect of maltreatment on 
youths may be debilitating while others may experience less adverse outcomes. One possible 




emotional expressions can be explained by compensating effects (Shafir, Tsachor, & Welsh, 
2015). That is, the atypical group’s failure to develop one type of emotion recognition (facial) 
due to early adverse experiences may enhance or compensate for the development of other 
areas of emotion recognition (e.g., bodily emotional recognition). In turn, this might be 
because of different patterns in looking (e.g., looking at bodies rather than eyes). This 
suggestion is entirely speculative but is offered as one explanation of the pattern of results. 
The influence of neglect is also consistent with previous research. The results indicate 
that neglect correlated negatively with recognition of emotion such that a longer duration of 
neglect resulted in worse recognition of emotion. This is consistent with Young and Widom 
(2014), who found that neglect predicted less accuracy in recognition of emotion. However, 
after controlling for age, vocabulary and fluid intelligence, neglect was not significantly 
associated with the recognition of emotion, indicating that, age, language, and fluid 
intelligence helped to explain the effect of neglect on recognition of emotion. 
 
Language and Fluid Intelligence 
In the atypical group, there was a positive correlation between age and language, but 
there was a negative correlation between age and fluid intelligence. Our finding that 
increasing age correlates positively with language was obviously expected and is consistent 
with previous research (e.g., Devine & Hughes, 2013). The negative correlation between age 
and fluid intelligence was unexpected. It was possibly due to the more serious nature of 
difficulties experienced by older participants still seeking help from Mirror Services. That is, 
usually, children come to Mirror Services at a younger age, and if they are still seeking help 
as adults that might indicate a more serious impairment. This argument would not, however, 




language (a crystallised intelligence measure) is less affected than fluid intelligence. Thus, 
the results present something of a conundrum. There was also no correlation between age, 
vocabulary, IQ and social understanding. This might be because correlations between 
language and social understanding have been established for very young children whose 
language is developing rapidly. Individuals in the atypical group all likely had language and 
fluid intelligence that would enable success (i.e., they were beyond the needed threshold), 
making correlations less likely. 
 
Mr Bean Task 
Because of the large number of potential correlations, my interest was in patterns. 
One pattern that emerged was for the Mr Bean Mental State items in which children endorsed 
negative mental state explanations (e.g., stating that Mr Bean inferred hostile intentions for 
others). It was incorrect to assume hostile intentions, but I anticipated that atypical children 
might be more likely to do this than typical children, and those atypical children who had 
experienced worse abuse might be most likely to do so. In fact, the results were the opposite. 
Individuals who incorrectly ascribed negative mental states were less likely to suffer from 
emotional and physical abuse, experienced less anxiety and fear, and had a better mood, and 
had better psychological outcomes. These results were not anticipated given that research 
indicates that maltreated school-age children show more illogical thinking than non-
maltreated children (Toth, Stonarch, Rogosch, Caplan, & Cicchetti, 2011). In our case, 
maltreated children showed evidence of better social understanding. Therefore, the results 
could indicate that abused children become more observant (searching for signs of danger), 
and hence, better at attributing mental states. By the same token, it is possible that abused 
children found the Mr Bean task humorous and, without danger to detect, didn’t experience 




There were also a few one-off correlations. For instance, more emotional and 
psychological abuse correlated with more errors on the Mr Bean Non-Mental State items. 
More neglect correlated with more errors on the Emotion task. There were also some 
correlations with individual emotions on the facial Emotion task. However, the limited data 
for individual emotions means it might be unwise to read too much into this. What is clear is 
that there were no general patterns (e.g., multiple correlations for individual emotions). 
 
Age, Fluid Intelligence and Vocabulary 
There were some significant correlations between age, fluid intelligence and 
vocabulary with the Mr Bean responses and the facial Emotion task. This is consistent with 
other findings for language (e.g., Calero, Salles, Semelman, & Sigman, 2013), fluid 
intelligence (Ibanez et al., 2013) and vocabulary (Devine & Hughes, 2016; Milligan et al., 
2007). For this reason, I partialled out age, fluid intelligence and vocabulary when further 
examining correlations in the atypical group. 
Having done so, two patterns emerged. First, emotional/psychological abuse 
correlated with more correct ascriptions of mental states on the Mr Bean Mental State items, 
fewer incorrect ascriptions of negative mental states on the Mr Bean Mental State items, and 
more incorrect non-mental state ascriptions on the Mr Bean Non-Mental State items. Thus, 
emotional/psychological abuse was associated with better ascription of mental states, though 
sometimes errors on the Mental State items in which they ascribed non-mental states. The 
second pattern was that, in addition to being associated with less emotional/psychological 
abuse, incorrect ascriptions of negative mental states on Mr Bean Mental State items were 
associated with lower levels of anxiety and fear, and with less severe psychological outcomes 
overall. Once again, then, the experience of adverse life situations seemed to assist children’s 




untenable (i.e., better mental state understanding would not seem to be a cause of worse life 
situations). Furthermore, although a third variable could be responsible for the correlation, 
the present study revealed these correlations after controlling for individuals’ age, language 
and fluid intelligence, and it is not apparent what the third variable could be otherwise. 
The present results are not consistent with some previous findings. For instance, Dogde, 
Pettit, Bates, and Valent (1995) found that 8- to 9-year-olds’ response to ambiguous scenes 
was a negative attribution bias for ambiguous acts. Likewise, maltreated children have more 
difficulty representing positive social interactions, although they are as good as typical peers 
at retelling stories about negative interactions (Ayoub et al., 2006). In contrast, I did not find 
evidence of negative attribution bias. In another study, Gaspen (2010) found that individual 
differences in maltreatment in adolescence were unrelated to youths’ social understanding, 
whereas I did find some relation. That said, our participants were older, allowing a relation 
between abuse and social understanding more significant time to evolve. 
 
Limitations 
Four features of this work limit the conclusions we can draw. First, the study was 
cross-sectional, not longitudinal, and thus is subject to all the shortcomings associated with 
the former design.  
Second, although we measured the components of social cognition with a new task 
(Bean Mental State), the gap between age within the atypical group was wide so that we 
could not include all the participants when compared with the typical group. The age was 
limited to 16 years which in turn reduced the atypical group sample size from 50 to 31. 
Although there was not much development differences that took place on the tasks after 16 




simply was not possible to get a younger group of typically developing children despite 
numerous approaches to schools.  
The third limitation was that all typical participants had a high level of formal 
education, whereas the atypical participants did not, although vocabulary and fluid 
intelligence were controlled for.  
The fourth limitation was that I did not collect socio-economic status (both parent 
education and economic advantage) information, which may have helped clarify some of the 
effects.  
Other difficulties also appeared when collecting data for the symptoms of the atypical 
group using the children’s agency. For example, we had planned to give the agency our own 
questionnaire in view to help them in their assessment of clients, but this was not possible 
since there was a concern regarding clients’ privacy and protection of information, so that we 
had to settle with what was presented to us as items for previous maltreatment history and 
psychological outcomes. Some degree of subjective bias could have influenced different 
therapists’ opinions of the atypical children, leading to an error in the assessment of their 
background and symptoms. 
 
Implications 
This research demonstrates the complexity of the relation between social 
understanding and wellbeing variables, in that the maltreated youth would do well on one 
task and poorly on another. This study also revealed that emotional/physical abuse relates to 
both mental states correct and mental state incorrect responses, indicating an unpredictability 
in maltreated individuals’ reading of others’ mental states. This indicates the difficulty in 
drawing a conclusive interpretation of their understanding of mental states, and further, the 





What stands out in this work is that social understanding was measured using an 
appropriate measure relevant to the age group (i.e., the Mr Bean task was likely to be 
inherently interesting to most adolescents and young adults). Also, I used standard emotion 
recognition measures and the Eyes task. Overall, this study involved reasoning about desires, 
knowledge, and beliefs. Further research is needed to examine psychological functioning to 
fully comprehend the mechanisms that might indicate an increased risk of thought disorder in 
these vulnerable adolescents. It would be of interest to run children, adolescents and young 
adults on the same tasks to examine developmental changes and the possibility that links 
between adversity and social understanding evolve over time, and that some aspects of social 
understanding might improve due to adversity. 
Future research might also address the clinical implications of psychological outcome 
differences in ToM. For example, a recent study has indicated that multiple types of 
maltreatment are more problematic for behavioural issues and wellbeing problems in 
adolescence (Mangion, 2014). I could not examine this issue in the present study because of 
the relatively poor documentation regarding background issues in the atypical group. Lastly, 
longitudinal studies involving a larger sample could be used to examine whether there is a 
potential third variable problem leading to a mistaken causal relation between from early 
maltreatment to later social understanding and vice versa. Further work is needed to establish 
whether the benefits of previous single maltreatment issue for ToM performance result in 
gains in youths’ social competence in everyday life activities and other settings.  
 
Conclusion 
My findings extend the current literature by demonstrating that there was not a critical 




I also controlled for verbal ability and fluid intelligence. Given these findings, the 
interpretation is contrary to previous studies. It will be important for future research to 
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Mr Bean Questionnaire (Typical group) 
1. 
A. Mr Bean doesn’t want anyone to know where he put his car key and thinks it will be 
safer under the bonnet. 
B. Mr Bean’s key will be dry if he keeps it under the bonnet so he puts it there. 
C. Mr Bean’s car will be safer if he keeps his key under the bonnet so he puts it there. 
2. 
A. The man looks at Mr Bean because Mr Bean needs to find out the time to catch the 
bus. 
B. The man looks at Mr Bean because Mr Bean has looked at his magazine. 
C. The man is annoyed. He thinks Mr Bean is too close and does not want a stranger to 
look over his shoulder. 
3. 
A. The man is having a heart attack. He moves towards Mr Bean for support as he falls 
over. 
B. The man has a bad stomach after eating bad food. He moves toward Mr Bean for 
support as he falls over. 
C. The man is pretending to be ill. He wants to test Mr Bean to see if he will help 





A. Mr Bean is using a paper tube to blow air into the man’s lips. 
B. Mr Bean is using a paper tube to hear what the man is saying. 
C. Mr Bean doesn’t know what to do. He wants to help the man, but doesn’t want to 
touch the man’s lips. 
5. 
A. Mr Bean gives the man pills to help him after he fell down and make him better. 
B. Mr Bean wants to open the bottle because he thinks the pills inside are yummy and he 
wants the man to have some too. 
C. Mr Bean gives the man pills because they are yummy and the man is in need of food. 
6. 
A. Mr Bean connects the cables to the lamp post to use the electricity from the lamppost 
to encourage the man to get up. 
B. Mr Bean is annoyed. He connects the cables to the lamp post to use electricity 
because he thinks the man is pretending to be ill. 
43 
C. Mr Bean connects the cables to the lamp post to use the electricity from the lamppost 
to re-start the man’s heart. 
7. 
A. The ambulance driver is confused. He wants his keys but doesn’t know where they 
are and looks for them everywhere. 





C. The ambulance driver turns the key but Mr Bean has drained the battery by charging 
his own car so the ambulance battery ran out of power. 
8. 
A. Mr Bean is worried. He thinks he swallowed the stamp he wanted to use for his letter 
and he will be sick. 
B. Mr Bean is licking his fingers to make them wet so he can seal the letter before he 
posts it. 
C. Mr Bean is looking for the stamp he left in his mouth, but he has swallowed it. 
9. 
A. Mr Bean likes lollies. He knows the lolly is in his pocket and feels happy when he 
licks it. 
B. Mr Bean uses the stickiness from the lolly to attach the stamp to the letter. 
C. Mr Bean needs a stamp, and is looking in his pocket for another one he can use but 
finds the lolly. 
10. 
A. Mr Bean got locked inside the mailbox and now wants to take some letters. 
B. Mr Bean got locked inside the mailbox and has to find a way out. 
C. Mr Bean goes into the mailbox because he’s worried the woman will see he didn’t 







Mr Bean questionnaire (atypical group) 
1. 
A. Mr Bean doesn’t want anyone to know where he put his car key and thinks it will be safer 
under the bonnet. 
B. Mr Bean’s key will be dry if he keeps it under the bonnet so he puts it there. 
C. Mr Bean’s car will be safer if he keeps his key under the bonnet so he puts it there. 
D. Mr Bean doesn’t want anyone to know where he put his car key because he thinks  most people 
are thieves. 
2.   
A. A. The man looks at Mr Bean because Mr Bean needs to find out the time to catch the bus.  
B. The man looks at Mr Bean because Mr Bean has looked at his magazine. 
C. The man is annoyed. He thinks Mr Bean is too close and does not want a stranger to look over 
his shoulder.  
D. The man is annoyed. He thinks that Mr Bean wants to take the magazine from him. 
 
3. 
A. Mr Bean is using a paper tube to blow air into the man’s lips. 
B. Mr Bean is using a paper tube to hear what the man is saying. 
C. Mr Bean doesn’t know what to do. He wants to help the man, but doesn’t want to touch the 
man’s lips.  
D. Mr Bean doesn’t know what to do. He doesn’t want to touch the man’s lips in case it makes 
him angry. 
4. 
A. Mr Bean is worried. He thinks he swallowed the stamp he wanted to use for his letter and he 
will be sick. 




C. Mr Bean is looking for the stamp he left in his mouth, but he has swallowed it.  
D. Mr Bean is licking his fingers to make them wet so he can seal the letter before he posts it 
5. 
A. Mr Bean got locked inside the mailbox and now wants to take some letters. 
B. Mr Bean got locked inside the mailbox and has to find a way out. 
C. Mr Bean goes into the mailbox because he’s worried the woman will see he didn’t post her 
letter and doesn’t want her to know where he is.  
D. Mr Bean goes into the mailbox because he’s worried the woman will see he didn’t post her 
letter and thinks she will want to hurt him. 
6. 
A. The man is having a heart attack. He moves towards Mr Bean for support as he falls over. 
B. The man has a bad stomach after eating bad food. He moves toward Mr Bean for support as 
he falls over. 
C. The man is pretending to be ill. He wants to test Mr Bean to see if he will help because he 
thinks Mr Bean won’t help. 
7. 
A. Mr Bean gives the man pills to help him after he fell down and make him better.  
B. Mr Bean wants to open the bottle because he thinks the pills inside are yummy and he wants 
the man to have some too. 
C. Mr Bean gives the man pills because they are yummy, and the man is in need of food. 
8. 
A. Mr Bean connects the cables to the lamp post to use the electricity from the lamppost to 
encourage the man to get up. 
B. Mr Bean is annoyed. He connects the cables to the lamp post to use electricity because he 
thinks the man is pretending to be ill.  
C. Mr Bean connects the cables to the lamp post to use the electricity from the lampost to re-start 





A. The ambulance driver is confused. He wants his keys but doesn’t know where they are and 
looks for them everywhere. 
B. The ambulance driver turns the key but there is no gas in the tank so the engine has no power. 
C. The ambulance driver turns the key but Mr Bean has drained the battery by charging his own 
car so the ambulance battery ran out of power. 
10. 
A. Mr Bean likes lollies. He knows the lolly is in his pocket and feels happy when he licks it.  
B. Mr Bean uses the stickiness from the lolly to attach the stamp to the letter. 


























Wellbeing items (Presenting concerns Coding:1 = Mild; 2 = Moderate; 3 = Severe) 
 
Emotional/Psychological/Mental Health 
____  Situational Crisis 
____  Low Mood / Sadness / Depression 
____     Anger 
____  Anxiety / Fears 
____  Grief / Loss 
____      Emotional Dysregulation 
____  AOD  
____  Mental Health Disorder/Illness _____________ 
____  Adjustment / Attachment 
____  Self Harm 
____  Parent/Child Relational 





____ Learning Difficulty 
____ Truancy  
____ Aggressive 
____ Criminal Offending 
____ Absconding From Care 
____ At Risk Sexual Behaviour 
____ Being Untruthful 








____ Peer Abuse 
____ Violence (including family)  
____ Sexual Abuse 
 ____ Emotional/Psychological Abuse 




COPMIA           Y / N 
 
Familial 
____  Separated Family 
____  AOD 
____  Mental Health 
____  Criminal Offending 
____  Incarcerated  
 
Health 
____  Physical 
____  Sexual  
____  Eating 
____  Sleep 
____  Pregnancy  


















____ Hypo Sedatives 
____ Solvents 
____ Synthetic Cannabinoids 
____ Amphetamines/Stimulants 
____ Other___________________________  
 
Process Addiction 
____ Internet / Social Media 
____ Gambling 
____ Gaming 
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